Nankai Economic Studies, 2008, Issue 5

Authors: Xie Juanjuan, Lü Yue

Abstract: This paper proposes the cluster strategy to SMEs that face most cases of oversea antidumping in China. It gives a game model for the SMEs the way to enter into the international market and the response for the enterprises in host countries to bring an accusation against the SMEs. One of the result is that the host enterprises whether they accuse or not will choose to stay in the market when the SMEs takes the cluster strategy. The other is that the loss to the host enterprises when they accuse will be much higher than that of bearing the SMEs accessing into the market. This brings the host enterprises a believable threaten that they have to choose the strategy of bearing the SMEs entering into the market and reach there fined sub—game Nash equilibrium under incomplete information. This result is providing the theoretical foundation for SMEs’ cluster strategy again antidumping.

Keywords: Antidumping; Cluster; SMEs; Game Theory Analysis